Another reprint of a comment, which more precisely deals with why philosophy is not not a science.
Briefly, I’m going to categorize the criticisms of psychometric science as philosophical (concerning the nature of quantification, panphysicalism, and the confounding material effects of the mind when measuring the body) and practical (concerning confounding variables like Eysenck’s psychoticism, usefulness of IQ, usefulness of intelligence in daily life, the closeness of measure between some imaginary True Intelligence and IQ scores, the possible existence of multiple modes of intelligence, etc. etc.).
The latter category is less interesting to me and irrelevant to the original subject of debate, because it requires a familiarity with the field of psychometrics that I can’t communicate in the 45 minutes before work starts. Dr. James Thompson has, thankfully, attempted to do this.
Quantification of the confounding influence of the mind on the meatbrain may be partially soluble (as through double-blind tests and what-have-you). Though interesting, I haven’t solved it, and anyway it’s not what we’re talking about here. We are interested only in the question of whether the meatbrain’s benchmark could, in theory, be disambiguated and quantified in physical units.
Panphysicalism is also a distraction. It seems like a simple one to me, because an idea can only be perceived by a mind, and the connection between the idea and its representation in a word, or an arrangement of atoms, or a series of changing voltages exchanged by transistors, can likewise only be perceived by a mind. A computer provides computation of numbers, not the meanings behind them.